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ABSTRACT
RACE AND GUN VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A CASE STUDY OF POLICY
REFORM IN MISSOURI
by
MORGAN C. WILLIAMS, JR.
Advisor: Michael Grossman
Gun violence remains an important contributor to racial differences in mortality within the
United States. Despite the existence of these significant racial disparities in firearm homicide vic-
timization, the relationship between gun control policy and racial disparities in homicide remains
largely unexplored within the empirical crime literature. Previous research suggests that access to
secondary firearm markets serves as a salient contributor to local gun violence with the regulation
of private firearm sales falling exclusively within state-level jurisdiction. The role of state-level
background check requirements for private firearm sales in reducing gun violence remains contro-
versial in both the empirical literature and gun control policy debate.
On August 28, 2007 the Missouri General Assembly repealed an 86 year-old “permit-to-
purchase” (PTP) law requiring that handgun purchasers possess a permit, and subsequently un-
dergo a background check, for all sales. The vast racial disparities in firearm homicide within
Missouri raises important questions concerning the disproportionate impact of the repeal on Black
communities throughout the state. The crime literature offers several theoretical explanations ac-
counting for the racial differences in gun violence with certain theories offering a valuable frame-
work to interpret the importance of gun control policy liberalization to these disparities. This
dissertation uses the Missouri permit-to-purchase law repeal as a case study in examining the dif-
ferential response to gun control policy liberalization across racial groups.
Using generalized synthetic control estimation, this study finds that the PTP repeal led to an
increase in county-level gun ownership in addition to substantial evidence of increased firearm
v
homicide in the early years of the 2007-2013 post-repeal period. Missouri experienced an ad-
ditional 1,234 handgun background checks by federally licensed dealers and an average seven
percentage point county-level (i.e., Jackson County and the Greater St. Louis area) increase in the
fraction of suicides committed with a firearm associated with repeal. State-level effects suggest
that overall Black firearm homicide increases on average by an additional five deaths per 100,000
(17 percent increase) while the same rates for Black victims ages 15-24 rise by 29 deaths per
100,000 (33 percent increase). County-level estimates also show considerable increases in firearm
homicide in Black communities within the more urban regions of the state. However, this study
finds no evidence of an increase in firearm homicide among White Missourians. Treatment effect
estimates for state-level Black firearm homicide translate into approximately an additional 260
deaths attributable to the change in the law over the 2007-2013 period.
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Despite experiencing significant declines over the past twenty years, gun violence remains
considerably higher in the United States (U.S.) relative to other western countries with signifi-
cant disparities across racial groups (Grinshteyn and Hemenway (2016)). While constituting less
than 13 percent of the population, Black Americans account for roughly half of all U.S. homicide
deaths–with nearly 84 percent of Black homicide victims killed with firearms in 2013. In 2008,
the Black homicide victimization rate exceeded the corresponding rate for White Americans by
six fold with Black homicide offending rates in the same year being seven times greater. Homicide
alone contributes nearly a full year to the 4.7 year gap in life expectancy between Black and White
U.S. males (Kochanek et al. (2013)). U.S. gun violence remains particularly concentrated in large
urban cities and metropolitan areas across the country (Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999); O’Flaherty
and Sethi (2010c)).
Over the course of the twentieth century, the U.S. experienced important changes in gun control
laws designed to limit the proliferation of firearms to individuals associated with criminal activity.
In particular, the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act set a federal mandate requiring
1
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background checks for all federal firearms license (FFL) sales and left regulation of private firearm
sales to states. While 34 states essentially leave private firearm sales unregulated, a few states
require that both unlicensed and licensed gun dealers perform background checks before making a
transaction. Other states mandate that all individuals (i.e., licensed or unlicensed) seeking to make
a firearm purchase must possess a permit—also known as permit-to-purchase (PTP) laws. Accord-
ing to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 2005 Survey of State Procedures Related to Firearm
Sales, only 16 states required some form of background check or licensing for private firearm sales.
Despite the existence of significant racial disparities in firearm homicide victimization, the extent
to which state-level gun control policies influence racial differences in homicide remains largely
unexplored within the gun control literature.
This dissertation examines how the 2007 permit-to-purchase law repeal influenced racial dif-
ferences in homicide within the state of Missouri.1 Under the former law, individuals wishing to
purchase a handgun were required to apply for a permit for all firearm sales (i.e., licensed and
unlicensed). The permit application process included an extensive background check conducted
by each local sheriff’s office–including information unavailable in federal background checks such
as civil proceedings and arrest records. The repeal of the 86 year old PTP law effectively removed
any formal screening of private firearm sales within the state.
Ranking among those states leading the nation in firearm homicide, Missouri serves as an in-
teresting case study on the effects of gun control policy on firearm homicide for several reasons.
First, the PTP law repeal took place more than 10 years after the national implementation of the
Brady Act which led to changes in gun control policies for FFL dealers operating in several states.
If any of these policy changes systematically influence patterns in gun trafficking between states,
this behavior could influence any interpretation of the consequences of gun control policy reform.
Second, Missouri possesses an extensive gun culture with robust primary and secondary markets
1This study excludes any analysis concerning Hispanic Missourians as they make up roughly four percent of the
population, but account for less than three percent of all firearm homicide deaths over the 1999-2013 period.
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for firearms throughout the state. The post-repeal period appears to coincide with a considerable
increase in a proxies for overall gun prevalence in addition to a rise in the number of recovered Mis-
souri crime guns originally purchased in the state.2 This paper argues that the removal of legally
required background checks led to an exogenous increase in gun proliferation to secondary markets
with estimation results mirroring the geographic distribution of recovered crime guns. Figures 1.1-
1.2 examine Missouri trends in various forms of serious index crime tracked by the FBI compared
to similar trends at the national level. Other than murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, other
forms of violent and nonviolent index are generally declining during the post-repeal period. Given
that the overwhelming majority of murders are committed using firearms, these trends provide
some suggestive evidence for a gun proliferation argument. Lastly, gun violence remains heavily
concentrated among young Black men within the urban regions of the state such as the City of St.
Louis, St. Louis County, and Kansas City (Jackson County)–accounting for nearly 80 percent of
all firearm deaths in 2006. Support for stricter gun control policies in cities runs in stark contrast
to the widespread support for less restrictive gun laws in rural areas of the state (Edsall (1999)).
Studies evaluating changes in state and federal gun laws provide fairly mixed evidence concern-
ing their protective effects and often disagree on the selection of a suitable control group (Loftin
et al. (1991); Kleck and Patterson (1993); Britt et al. (1996); Ludwig and Cook (2000); Koper
and Roth (2002); Levitt (2004)). Using crime data from 1980 on large cities, Kleck and Patterson
(1993) presents two-stage least squares estimates providing no evidence of an association between
gun control laws and rates of violence. However, their usage of National Rife Association (NRA)
membership and “liberal” voters as instruments remains questionable. Ludwig and Cook (2000)
implement a quasi-experimental design based on the 1993 passage of the Brady Act–with the treat-
ment units being the “Brady states” required by the new law to implement background checks on
2Unfortunately, Section 571.093 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri precludes the sharing of permit-to-purchase
a firearm application data by any Missouri county sheriff’s office and states, “If any sheriff retains record of permits
to obtain concealable firearms issued under former section 571.090, as repealed by senate bills nos. 62 and 41 of the
ninety-fourth general assembly, then such records shall be closed to the public. No such record shall be made available
for any purpose whatsoever unless its disclosure is mandated by a valid court order relating to a criminal investigation.”
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(a) Aggravated Assault (b) Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter
(c) Forcible Rape (d) Robbery
Figure 1.1: FBI Violent Index Crime: Missouri v. U.S.
federally licensed sales in addition to enforcing a five day waiting period. The authors find no sta-
tistical evidence suggesting that the Brady Act lowered firearm homicide rates for any age group,
but do find evidence of a reduction in firearm suicides among adults ages 55 and older. Koper
and Roth (2002) find that the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban led to a short-run surge in assault
weapons production and decline in prices in the months shortly after the ban’s enactment. Rudolph
et al. (2015) find that the 1995 implementation of Connecticut’s permit-to-purchase law led to a
40 percent reduction in firearm homicide 10 years after the law’s implementation, but provide no
evidence of the law’s impact on secondary firearm markets and do not address issues of potential
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(a) Burglary (b) Property Crime
(c) Larceny Theft (d) Motor Vehicle Theft
Figure 1.2: FBI Nonviolent Index Crime: Missouri v. U.S.
donor pool contamination. More recently, Levine and McKnight (2017) present evidence that the
December 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton, Connecticut resulted in
an additional 60 overall unintentional shooting deaths with 20 of them occurring among children.
Relevant to this study, Webster et al. (2014) estimate the effect of the Missouri permit-to-
purchase law repeal on (overall) state-level firearm homicide and murder rates. Citing concerns
over confounding factors such as changes in crack cocaine markets during the 1990s, they specif-
ically focus on a pre-intervention beginning in 1999 and post-intervention period leading up to
2012. The authors report an ordinary least squares estimate of an additional 1.09 firearm homi-
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cide deaths per 100,000 or a 23 percent increase, but find no evidence of an effect for nonfirearm
homicide rates.
While Webster et al. (2014) provide important insight regarding the impact of the permit-to-
purchase law repeal on Missouri gun violence, their empirical approach possesses several limita-
tions. First, the authors provide little direct evidence concerning the mechanism through which
the permit-to-purchase law repeal led to an increase in firearm homicide. Understanding whether
the impact of the repeal remains attributable to increased gun proliferation or changes in unem-
ployment requires a more nuanced discussion on changes within secondary firearm markets within
Missouri. Second, the authors utilize data from all 43 states with fully available vital statistics data
on firearm homicide and their analysis implicitly assumes that each control unit should receive
equal weight in constructing Missouri’s counterfactual firearm homicide trends. The growing pop-
ularity of synthetic control estimation in policy evaluation stems from the fact that ad hoc control
group selection often leads to conflicting results due to differences in the assumptions behind their
constructed counterfactuals. While largely a puzzling omission within the larger empirical gun
control literature, the authors also fail to address the extraordinary overrepresentation of young
Black Missourians from urban areas in firearm homicide mortality. Focusing exclusively on state-
level firearm homicide trends for the entire population also masks important heterogeneity in the
impact of the repeal across age groups, racial groups, and geographical locations.
This study addresses a key issue within the empirical literature on gun control policy concern-
ing the selection of control units in constructing counterfactual homicide rates. While finding evi-
dence of a slightly smaller treatment effect of 0.9716 for overall firearm homicide or a 17 percent
increase, this study also re-examines the effects of the PTP law repeal on various Missouri sub-
populations utilizing the generalized synthetic control (GSC) estimator introduced in Xu (2017).
Building on the Abadie et al. (2010) synthetic control (SC) methodology and the interactive fixed
effects model from Bai (2009), GSC estimation relaxes several assumptions behind SC estimation
which assist in constructing valid counterfactual firearm homicide trends in Missouri–namely the
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inclusion of multiple treatment units and the reweighting of full control group data by accounting
for unobservable latent factors. Thus, GSC estimation permits a deeper analysis into the persis-
tently high Black firearm homicide rates in Missouri (relative to other states) and provides evidence
of the heterogenous impact of the PTP repeal at the county-level.
This study finds that the Missouri permit-to-purchase law repeal led to significant changes to
both primary and secondary firearm markets in Missouri. In particular, Missouri experienced an
additional 1,234 handgun background checks per 100,000 residents and an average seven percent-
age point county-level increase (i.e., Jackson County and the Greater St. Louis area) in the fraction
of suicides committed with a firearm over the post-repeal period. These results also suggest that
the repeal led to significant increases in Black firearm homicide of five to six additional deaths per
100,000 (17 percent) over the post-repeal period. Firearm homicide among Black victims ages 15-
24 increases on average by an additional 29 deaths (33 perecent) over this period with substantial
increases in overall Black firearm homicide in the City of St. Louis, St. Louis County, and Jackson
County. The greatest impact of the PTP repeal generally takes place within the first few years of
the post-repeal period. Given the intense spatial concentration in post-repeal gun violence, these
findings remains consistent with theories based on strategic complementarities in the economics
of crime literature.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. Section 1.2 examines descriptive evidence con-
cerning post-repeal changes in gun proliferation and the growing number of firearms recovered
from crime scenes. Section 1.3 examines racial differences in Missouri firearm homicide trends
and provides context for these trends in urban areas of the state accounting for the majority of
gun violence. An immediate discussion follows in Chapter 2 exploring the theoretical literature on
the underlying mechanisms behind racial differences in crime. Chapter 3 describes the empirical
strategy, data sources, and sample restrictions for this study. Chapter 4 reports the generalized
synthetic control estimation results concerning gun proliferation and firearm homicide mortality.
The paper concludes in Chapter 5.
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1.2 Gun Ownership and the 2007 Missouri Permit-to-Purchase Law Repeal
In examining the the effects of the 2007 PTP repeal on firearm homicide within Missouri, an
important question remains whether or not the repeal also led to an increase in the proliferation of
firearms throughout the state. The number of background checks performed by federally licensed
dealers provides some information concerning the increase in gun prevalence after the 2007 repeal.
Figure 1.3 shows trends in National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) back-
ground checks in Missouri and the U.S. by gun type. Under the former permit-to-purchase law,
background checks by FFL dealers supplemented the more extensive checks conducted by local
sheriffs’ offices throughout the state.3 While the NICS measure only reflects the rate of background
checks in (potential) sales by FFL dealers, these rates provide valuable insight into the prolifera-
tion of firearms to secondary markets (legal and illegal). Missouri experiences a sharp post-repeal
increase in handgun background checks relative to the national level. Missouri FFL dealers con-
ducted an average 719.95 handgun background checks per 100,000 residents between 1999 and
2006 before rising to 1,381.34 handgun background checks in 2007 and peaking at 3,982.92 in
2013. Similar to national trends, the rate of long gun (e.g., rifles and shotguns) background checks
remain fairly flat until undergoing a slight increase after 2010.
While administrative data providing reliable estimates of gun prevalence largely remain absent
in the U.S., the economics of crime literature offers other insightful proxies for gun ownership
(Duggan (2001); Cook and Ludwig (2006)). Empirical work below the national and state-level of-
ten utilize the fraction of suicides committed with a firearm (FSS) in estimating firearm prevalence
in local private markets. Cook and Ludwig (2006) find evidence of a strong (positive) correlation
between FSS and gun ownership measured in the General Social Survey relative to the correlation
3The FBI launched NICS in 1998 as mandated by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. The
FBI requires all FFLs to conduct a background check for all potential firearm or explosives purchases with intrastate
private purchases being regulated by state law. NICS background checks generally take only a few minutes, but any
check taking longer than three days in duration can proceed legally without further inquiry. For more information see:
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics
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(a) Missouri (b) U.S.
Figure 1.3: FFL Background Checks Per 100,000 by Gun Type: Missouri v. U.S.
of the latter with Guns and Ammo magazine subscriptions. The authors also provide county-level
evidence of a 0.173 firearm homicide elasticity with respect to lagged FSS. Moreover, the strong
association between FSS and firearm homicide among victims ages 15-19 suggests that local sec-
ondary markets play an important role in driving the proliferation of firearms to underground mar-
kets.
Figure 1.4 shows county-level variation in FSS over the 1981-2013 study period for Jackson
County, St. Louis County, and the City of St. Louis. Jackson County experiences a slight decline
in FSS during the mid-2000s before rising to 43.3 percent in 2009. In St. Louis County, FSS
fluctuates between 30 and 40 percent before reaching a high of 44 percent in 2012. However, the
largest increase in FSS occurs within the neighboring City of St. Louis with nearly 67 percent of
all suicides committed with a firearm in 2011.
This study remains particularly interested in the extent to which firearms become increasingly
available among individuals associated with criminal activity. Table 1.1 provides descriptive ev-
idence concerning the rate at which firearms tend to appear in Missouri crimes scenes relative to
their purchase date. Since 2006 the average amount of time before recovery at a Missouri crime
scene fell 26 percent from 11.22 years to 8.94 years in 2013 or two years below the national aver-
age. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) also defines unusually short
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Figure 1.4: Missouri Fraction of Suicides Committed with a Firearm (FSS): 1981-2013
“time-to-crime” rates as crimes guns recovered within two years of original purchase from a FFL
dealer and interpret this measure as a sign of gun trafficking. While the Missouri time-to-crime rate
stands at 23.44 percent in 2006, this measure reaches a high of 45.3 percent in 2011 before declin-
ing slightly to 39.26 percent in 2013. One interpretation of the significant decline in time-to-crime
rates remains the increased value that illegal markets place on new firearms as older weapons pos-
sess greater risk of malfunction and links to previous crimes (Levitt and Venkatesh (2000)). The
City of St. Louis and Kansas City account for the vast majority of Missouri firearm traces–roughly
40 and 20 percent over the 2007-2013 post-repeal period, respectively. At the height of post-repeal
gun violence, the number of traced crime guns rose 28 percent in the City of St. Louis and 39
percent in Kansas City since 2006. Overall, the ATF trace data suggests that the Missouri PTP
repeal led to a substantial increase in the domestic proliferation of firearms to illegal secondary
markets.
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Table 1.1: Missouri Firearm Time-to-Crime Rates: 2006-2013
Year < 3 Months 3-7 Months 7-12 Months 1-2 Years 2-3 Years ≥ 3 Years Average U.S. Average
2006 71 89 78 159 123 1698 11.22 10.17
2007 106 95 88 166 150 1725 10.68 10.33
2008 222 174 125 159 131 1562 10.30 10.39
2009 203 173 204 319 136 1484 9.34 10.77
2010 227 213 194 386 251 1698 9.25 10.94
2011 233 191 201 347 260 1504 8.66 11.20
2012 243 153 190 323 238 1566 8.93 11.12
2013 169 189 229 325 271 1830 8.94 11.08
Source: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Firearm Tracing System
1.3 Race and Homicide in Missouri
A considerable gap exists in the rates of firearm homicide across racial groups in Missouri.
Constituting roughly 11 percent of the population, Black Missourians account for approximately
66 percent of all Missouri firearm homicide deaths over the study period. Figure 1.5 compares
Missouri firearm homicide rates to rates at the national level by racial group using vital statistics
data. As one might expect, the Black firearm homicide rates in Missouri largely mirror the overall
state-level trends due to the significant overrepresentation of Black Missourians in firearm homi-
cide. The Black firearm homicide rate in Missouri peaks at 50.74 per 100,000 in 1993, or roughly
twice the national rate, before declining sharply in the late 1990s. The White firearm homicide
rates in Missouri slightly exceed the national rates until the late 1990s when both rates fall to less
than two deaths per 100,000. Both Black and White firearm homicide rates rise in Missouri during
the post-repeal period–although the increase in Black firearm rates rise considerably higher after
the PTP repeal.
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(a) Black (b) White
Figure 1.5: Firearm Homicide Rates Per 100,000 by Race: Missouri v. U.S.
Mortality data also suggests that an overwhelming number of Missouri firearm homicide deaths
occurs among young Black males. In 2006, Black males between the ages of 10 and 30 accounted
for nearly 45 percent of all firearm homicide deaths in the state. Figure 1.6 shows racial differences
in male firearm homicide within the state of Missouri. While confirming a familiar age gradient
in firearm homicide, these data also show the extent of Black male overrepresentation in firearm
homicide victimization across all age groups. Black firearm homicide rates are largely driven by
young men ages 15-24 and rise to over 200 deaths per 100,000 in the early years of the post-
repeal period. Post-repeal White male firearm homicide remains highest among victims in the
intermediate range, but rates for each of these groups never exceeds 10 deaths per 100,000 over
the study period.
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics for Jackson County, St. Louis County, and the City of
St. Louis which account for the majority of firearm homicide within Missouri. The first four rows
show significant changes in average overall firearm homicide and Black firearm homicide in the
post-repeal period for all three areas. Black firearm homicide increases roughly 23 percent in the
City of St. Louis from an average 40.71 deaths per 100,00 to 49.71 over the 2007-2013 period.
Similarly, Jackson County experiences a 16 percent increase in Black firearm homicide and St.
Louis County a 26 percent increase. Table 1.2 shows pronounced socioeconomic disparities among
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(a) Black Males (b) White Males
Figure 1.6: Missouri Male Firearm Homicide Rates by Race and Age-Group
Black and White Missourians in each area. The percentage of female-headed households stands at
20 percent in the City of St. Louis compared to 15.31 percent in Jackson County and 13.64 percent
in St. Louis County. Across each of these measures Black-White disparities remain consistently
higher within the City of St. Louis which also hosts one of the largest Black populations among
U.S. cities. According to U.S. census data, the City of St. Louis also ranks among the top 10 most
racially segregated cities in the U.S. with the 2010 isolation index indicating that approximately
three quarters of Black residents live in a census tract where the average Black person resides. The
last two rows also show a considerably higher law enforcement presence for the City of St. Louis
in terms of jail incarceration and law enforcement officers per capita.
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Table 1.2: Missouri County-Level Descriptive Statistics, 2006
Variables Jackson County St. Louis County City of St. Louis
Firearm Homicide Rate (Per 100,000)
Pre-Repeal (2000-2006) 11.51 5.16 21.07
Post-Repeal (2007-2013) 13.47 7.09 25.29
Black Firearm Homicide Rate (Per 100,000)
Pre-Repeal (2000-2006) 34.50 17.97 40.47
Post-Repeal (2007-2013) 40.17 22.63 49.71
Unemployment Rate (%)
Black 10.78 7.69 16.66
White 3.38 3.52 7.05
Poverty (%)
Black 20.22 17.72 32.06
White 6.91 4.34 13.03
Ln(Income Per Capita)
Black 9.83 9.91 9.56
White 10.26 10.52 10.18
Black (%) 23.67 21.60 50.01
Female-Headed Households (%) 15.31 13.64 20.14
Jail Incarceration Rate (Per 100,000) 203.20 138.34 752.17
Law Enforcement Officers (Per 100,000) 304.30 258.27 466.37
Notes: Data on firearm homicide are age-adjusted and come from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
mortality detail files. Law enforcement officer data come from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Jail incar-
ceration data come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Annual Survey of Jails and Census of Jails. Other
demographic data come from the Bureau of the Census. All descriptive statistics pertain to the year 2006 unless stated
otherwise.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2: Theories on Racial Differences
in Homicide
An extensive interdisciplinary literature exists providing theoretical explanations for racial dif-
ferences in criminal behavior. Differential responsiveness to gun control policy reform, such as
Missouri’s permit-to-purchase law repeal, requires a deeper understanding of the various intel-
lectual approaches to the question of race and crime. The extent to which racial differences in
gun violence remain attributable to poverty or cultural norms is a vital question for gun control
policy evaluation. Much of the theoretical work on race and crime generally belongs to four differ-
ent themes spanning disciplines from criminology to economics–social disorganization, cultural
norms, gun proliferation, and social interactions.
2.1 Social Disorganization
Social disorganization theory focuses on the importance of certain ecological characteristics
and social structures in shaping criminal behavior. In their early work examining the spatial and
temporal variation in crime within Chicago, Shaw and McKay (1942) introduce social disorgani-
zaiton theory based on their findings of persistent concentration of crime in urban neighborhoods
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often characterized by economic deprivation and high residential mobility. According to the au-
thors, these conditions can produce “socially disorganized” neighborhoods where the absence of
influential social institutions can lead to distorted attitudes and norms concerning criminal behav-
ior. Wilson (1987) argues that “concentration effects,” reflecting the presence of greater socioeco-
nomic disadvantage in indicators such as poverty and the number of female-headed households,
often produce significant racial differences in norms surrounding criminal behavior. Building on
Shaw and McKay (1942), Sampson and Wilson (1995) emphasize the importance of “macroso-
cial structures” where the intense concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage often produces
significant racial differences in norms surrounding criminal behavior. According to this theory,
the disproportionate representation of Black Americans in firearm homicide might emerge due to
presence of greater socioeconomic disadvantage and the inability of neighborhood members to co-
ordinate on acceptable cultural norms around gun violence. Indeed, Table 1.2 shows that Jackson
County and the Greater St. Louis area exhibit many of the characteristics associated with social
disorganization.
The spatial distribution of gun violence in Missouri also remains consistent with a story based
on social disorganization theory. Rural Missouri is overwhelmingly White with higher levels of
poverty and lower levels of educational achievement relative to urban areas such as Kansas City
and the Greater St. Louis area (Dyne et al. (2015)). However, firearm homicide almost exclusively
takes place within the urban regions of the state. Social disorganization theory would suggest that
despite the elevated presence of rural socioeconomic disadvantage, sparse populations and lower
levels of residential turnover might allow for these areas to enforce certain cultural norms with re-
spect to crime. In a case study on gentrification in weaker housing markets in the Greater St. Louis
area from 1970-2010, Swanstrom et al. (2016) finds that the predominately Black neighborhoods
in northern St. Louis failed to exhibit any meaningful economic improvement (i.e., housing market
value and per capita income) over the forty year study period while also suffering from the outward
migration of middle class and affluent households. Thus, social disorganization would attribute the
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racial differences in Missouri firearm homicide to an inability of these disadvantaged urban areas
to construct appropriate norms concerning gun violence.
While social disorganization theory provides some insight concerning the pronounced racial
differences in Missouri gun violence, the theory remains fairly limited in understanding the tem-
poral variation in firearm homicide. Demographic and socioeconomic variables generally possess
limited explanatory power in empirical work on homicide (Rogers et al. (2001); Levitt (2004);
O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010b)). Linking data from the National Health Interview Survey to vital
statistics data, Rogers et al. (2001) finds that common demographic variables (e.g., marital status
and education) account for roughly 35 percent of the differences in homicide between Black and
White Americans. Moreover, trends in variables such as Black unemployment and poverty for
Missouri remain fairly constant going into the post-repeal period.
Social disorganization theory also provides limited guidance in understanding the temporal
variation in firearm homicide mortality. In the case of Missouri, places such as northern St. Louis
and crime along Independence Avenue in Kansas City possess traditionally higher crime rates
when compared to other neighborhoods in each city. However, post-repeal state-level firearm
homicide trends are largely driven by changes in gun violence within these neighborhoods. Social
disorganization also foregoes an explicit discussion of the incentives associated with the usage of
firearms in homicidal interactions. Given the significant role of firearms in Missouri homicide
trends, social disorganization also offers little direction in understanding the impact of secondary
firearm markets on racial differences in homicide.
2.2 Cultural Norms
Other studies examining the nature of racial differences in homicide explicitly account for the
role of cultural norms. In contrast to social disorganization theory, theories based on cultural norms
place less emphasis on group-level differences in structural disadvantage and suggest a greater
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role for the social construction of group beliefs concerning crime. Explanations primarily based
on cultural norms do not completely rule out the importance of poverty and unemployment, but
instead focuses on the group-level formation of these cultural values.
(a) 1983 (b) 1993
(c) 2003 (d) 2008
Figure 2.1: Firearm Homicide in the United States
Early research puts forth a theory based on the idea of a “subculture of violence” either within
the southern region of the U.S. or geographical areas containing large populations with southern
lineage (Hawkins (1987); Lester (1987); Nisbett and Cohen (1996)). This line of research argues
that southerners historically developed cultural norms more permissive of violence and these norms
were passed along to younger generations with southern heritage. For example, Nisbett and Cohen
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(1996) suggest that the South possesses a “culture of honor” requiring immediate responses to
personal insults and greater emphasis on self-defense–reflected in the cultural norms, institutions,
and gun control laws within the region. As shown in Figure 2.1, firearm homicide rates historically
remain considerably higher in the South compared to other regions throughout the country. Given
the historical prominence of “southern culture” throughout the state of Missouri, one could imagine
that higher firearm homicide rates in place like St. Louis might be partially attributable to the
intergenerational transmission of these values. However, theories based on “culture of honor”
do not possess any robust empirical support within the homicide literature (Rogers et al. (2001)).
Moreover, the extent to which Black and White Missourians differ in their responsiveness to insults
or self-defense remains unclear.
In his ethnographic work within urban Philadelphia, Anderson (2000) describes the role of
“street” families in determining the social conditions and cultural dynamics of neighborhoods
shared by “decent families.” He further argues that the participation in activities such as drug
markets by street people, in addition to a common distrust or lacking presence of institutions to
enforce behavior within those markets, often push even decent people to pursue firearms in order
to navigate the dangers of their environment.
The street-decent characterization offered in Anderson (2000) remains consistent with quali-
tative research on “code of the street” behavior within the most disadvantaged neighborhoods in
the Greater St. Louis area–where lower levels of institutional mistrust allow for members of street
families to implement certain norms concerning the use of violence (Decker and Winkle (1996);
Kubrin and Weitzer (2003)). In a recent investigation of policing practices within Ferguson, Mis-
souri (located within St. Louis County), the U.S. Justice Department finds that the reliance on
citation revenue by the Ferguson police department and municipal courts led to racial bias in their
policing practices with African-American residents accounting for over 90 percent of issued ci-
tations from 2012-2014 (DOJ (2015)). Constructing (measurement error corrected) cost-benefit
estimates associated with the impact of hiring additional police officers on violent crime, Chalfin
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and McCrary (2013) finds that the City of St. Louis remains one of the most underpoliced cities in
the country with the city ranking 233 out of sample 242 U.S. cities. If code of the street behavior
indeed exists within the disadvantaged urban regions of Missouri, one explanation for the post-
repeal increase in Missouri gun violence could involve perturbed cultural norms by street families
in the usage of readily accessible firearms to settle disputes.
Adapting the work in Becker (1968) on crime and punishment, Akerlof and Yellen (1994)
specifically model the importance of community norms concerning law enforcement on gang be-
havior. The authors argue that the ability of the government (the principal) to monitor the behavior
of criminals (the agent) remains confounded by the level of community cooperation.1 Within their
framework, gang members are aware of law enforcement’s dependence on community cooperation
while community members fear potential gang retaliation from cooperating with law enforcement.
While the government faces no explicit costs associated with the enforcement of punishment, com-
munity norms surrounding fair punishment alter their optimal incentive scheme. A key prediction
from their model suggests that an increase in both the community propensity to report crime and
social norms on punishment fairness can lead to a reduction in crime committed by gang members.
The lack of established property rights in underground markets and absence of effective institu-
tions to enforce social norms often allow significant participants in criminal behavior to influence
social norms surrounding violence (Levitt and Venkatesh (2000)). Disadvantaged neighborhoods
in Kansas City and the City of St. Louis historically have been susceptible to street culture such
as gang violence and other vice activity (Decker and Winkle (1996); KCPD (2016)). If gun invest-
ment by gangs reduces the expected costs of committing crime, due to a reduction in community
cooperation or an increase in government monitoring costs, the Akerlof and Yellen (1994) model
1Other work also suggests the importance of community cooperation and law enforcement legitimacy on neigh-
borhood crime. Focusing specifically on homicide within a predominately Black Watts neighborhood in southern Los
Angeles, Leovy (2015) describes a complex narrative of how community distrust and scarcity in high quality policing
in cases involving Black victims can often lead to wide disparities in homicide. Fortner (2015) also documents a sim-
ilar relationship between the dynamic formation of community social norms on punishment fairness and government
cooperation in Harlem leading up to the passage of the Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York.
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predicts higher levels of gun violence similar to the post-repeal trends in Missouri. Thus, Black-
White differences in community social norms with respect to crime could explain the differential
response to increased secondary firearm market access across both groups.
However, theories based on cultural norms also have several limitations in explaining racial
differences in observed post-repeal gun violence. Both anecdotal evidence and police reports sug-
gest that the post-repeal increase in gun violence does not appear to be driven by gang violence–
with gangs in places like the City of St. Louis consisting of mainly small scale networks rather
than the more well known hierarchical gangs responsible for large scale drug trafficking (Phillips
(2015)). Post-repeal firearm homicide trends also appear to be driven by “everyday disputes” in-
stead of gang warfare. More importantly, theories based on cultural norms offer little insight into
the determinants of temporal variation in gun violence and generally provide no clear direction in
understanding their underlying racial disparities.
2.3 Technological Spillovers and Vice Activity
Other work explaining the racial differences in gun violence focus on the proliferation of ille-
gal firearms associated with vice activity (Blumstein et al. (2000)). O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010c)
present a model explaining the spatial concentration of street vice (e.g., illegal drug and prostitu-
tion markets) in Black neighborhoods within urban areas. In contrast to the concentration effects
explored in Wilson (1987), the intense concentration of vice activity in (densely populated) urban
Black neighborhoods can arise due to the location preferences of sellers and households–with the
latter group differing in characteristics such as income and their willingness to be exposed to illegal
activity. Within these neighborhoods, lower prices in vice activity influences residential mobility
between urban centers and the suburbs resulting in greater exposure for Black residents. If murder
serves a strategic role in markets lacking the necessary institutions to resolve property right issues
and disputes, one would also expect to see an increase in gun investment within these neighbor-
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hoods. Other work also suggests that similar spatial patterns exists with respect to gun violence.
Braga et al. (2010) finds that 89 percent of Boston street segments never experienced a firearm in-
cident with gun violence mainly concentrated among Boston youth in a few hotspots. As discussed
in Section 2.1, residential mobility and vice activity in the Greater St. Louis area exhibit similar
spatial patterns over the past 40 years (Swanstrom et al. (2016)). From 2008-2015, one-third of
City of St. Louis neighborhoods account for 80 percent of homicides and these neighborhoods are
overwhelmingly located in northern St. Louis (Phillips (2015)).
Another possible explanation for racial disparities in firearm homicide focuses on gun prolifer-
ation as a form of technological spillover. Examining the spatial and temporal changes associated
with the rise of Colombian drug cartels as the main supplier to international cocaine markets,
Gaviria (2000) notes that firearm homicide in Medellin grew 1,211 percent during the 1980s. With
drug trafficking serving as a source of learning and technological spillovers for small-scale crim-
inals, the author argues that the transitory shocks associated with drug cartel activity eventually
became more permanent means of conducting illegal activity in Colombia. Empirical studies on
gun violence lend some support to the importance of gun proliferation as technological spillovers.
Using longitudinal data based on adolescents in Chicago, Bingenheimer et al. (2005) find that ex-
posure to firearm violence doubles the probability of an adult committing a serious violent offense
over the two years succeeding exposure.
Post-repeal changes in gun homicide victimization remains primarily concentrated among Black
Missourians. More importantly, post-repeal racial differences in homicide victimization remain al-
most exclusively attributable to the increasing number of Black firearm homicide deaths relative to
homicide by other means. Using vital statistics data, Figure 2.2 shows trends in the ratio of firearm
homicide deaths to nonfirearm homicide deaths among non-Hispanic White and Black Missouri-
ans. While this ratio remains very close to one for White Missourians over this period, Black
firearm deaths are four times greater during the crime epidemic of the early 1990s before rising to
seven during the post-repeal period. These figures suggest that the post-repeal racial differences
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Figure 2.2: Missouri Firearm-Nonfirearm Homicide Ratios by Race: 1981-2013
in homicide within the state of Missouri appear to be driven by a contemporary increase in gun
proliferation.
An important limitation of an explanation based on technological spillovers associated with
vice activity involves the fact that post-repeal gun violence seems to be driven by everyday disputes
rather than large scale gang warfare (Phillips (2015)). Given the extensive racial differences in
Missouri firearm homicide trends, any theory explaining these differences must account for the
lack of post-repeal increases in firearm homicide in other geographical areas in the state with
higher levels of gun ownership yet lower levels of gun violence. In discussing U.S. gun violence,
the current literature also requires further work on the importance of access to secondary firearm
markets.
2.4 Social Interactions
Other theoretical work on the racial differences in crime explicitly accounts for the importance
of social interactions to firearm homicide trends. At the height of post-repeal Missouri gun violence
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in 2010, nearly 71 percent of reported homicides involved homicide victims killed by someone that
they knew with a significant proportion of homicides driven by a dispute (Sugarmann (2013)). In
discussing racial differences in gun violence, residential segregation also serves as an important
determinant of social interactions involving homicide. This work often builds on the fact that
most homicides committed in the U.S. are intraracial–with 84 percent White victims killed by a
White offender and 93 percent of Black homicide victimization committed by Black offenders
over the 1980-2008 period (Cooper and Smith (2011)). Even among interracial murders, homicide
victimization is more likely to committed by a stranger. Using data from the 1990 FBI Uniform
Crime Reports, Shihadeh and Flynn (1996) finds that Black residential isolation from Whites (i.e.,
the probability that a randomly drawn Black city resident interacts with a White city resident)
serves as an important correlate for Black homicide rates.
The FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports provide some unique insight concerning the racial
characteristics of homicide. Similar to the Uniform Crime Reports, law enforcement agencies re-
port these initial data to FBI on various characteristics for each offender and victim involved in
the homicide–including the number of people reportedly involved, weapons used, relationship of
the offender to the (first) victim, circumstances leading up to the homicide, and other sociode-
mographic information. However, an important limitation of these data involves the fact that the
Supplementary Homicide Reports only contain preliminary reporting on homicides by local law
enforcement agencies. While law enforcement agencies continuously update their own homicide
records with progress made on each case, this updated information is not reported to the FBI.
Following the Supplementary Homicide Report imputation practices in Cooper and Smith
(2011), Figure 2.3 shows the cross-sectional relationship between residential segregation accord-
ing to the isolation index and homicide victimization across racial groups in large U.S. cities.2
2This analysis specifically uses the nonparametric missForest imputation algorithm in order to impute missing val-
ues in the Supplementary Homicide Report data. The algorithm makes use of the random forest algorithms from ma-
chine learning using other homicide characteristics to predict the missing values. For more information see Stekhoven
and Buehlmann (2012) and Stekhoven (2013).
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(a) Black (b) White
Figure 2.3: Segregation and Victimization by Race: Large U.S. Cities
This figure adjusts for racial composition while removing year effects and city effects. Both fig-
ures show the stark differences in the relationship between residential segregation and homicide
victimization. Homicide victimization appears to rise with residential segregation for Black Amer-
icans and falls for White Americans. This finding supports the claim that residential segregation
serves as an important determinant of social interactions and subsequently trends in race-specific
homicide.
The economics of crime literature offers several theories based on the notion that social interac-
tions characterized by disputes can often lead to social multipliers in violence while also explaining
the spatial, temporal, and group-level differences in crime (Glaeser et al. (1996); O’Flaherty and
Sethi (2010b); O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010a)). Glaeser et al. (1996) present a model of local inter-
actions in crime that give rise to informational spillovers and lead to multiple equilibria consistent
with the high degree of variation in crime rates across U.S. cities. Utilizing city-level crime data
from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and precinct-level New York City crime data, the
authors find suggestive evidence of higher levels of social interactions involving property crime
while observing low levels for murder and rape–with the former possessing higher levels of social
interactions in cities with a greater number of female-headed households. A low level of social in-
teractions in murder, relative to less violent offenses involving property, certainly makes intuitive
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sense as murder tends to be committed in more intimate settings and involve localized disputes.
While Glaeser et al. (1996) provides a unique framework to address the importance of social
interactions across various types of crime, questions still remain concerning both the interpersonal
nature of homicide and the preemptive motives of parties to a potentially homicidal interaction to
preserve their own life. Papachristos (2009) argues that social dominance often leads to murder
being retaliatory in nature as the decision of whether or not to commit murder must take into ac-
count the possibility of future opponents. Even in the absence of significant gang activity, murder
in places like the northern neighborhoods within the City of St. Louis often possess a retaliatory el-
ement. Examining homicide narratives in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods in the City of St.
Louis, Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) finds that retaliatory homicides in these areas often stem from
relatively minor disputes involving insults. Moreover, mistrust of law enforcement and fear of ret-
ribution by neighborhood residents allows for the retaliatory homicides to persist over time. Thus,
an important component to understanding the differential policy response to access to secondary
firearm markets in Missouri requires an accounting of these interpersonal relationships driving gun
violence in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Other studies providing theoretical explanations for racial differences in homicide model these
interpersonal relationships as strategic complementarities (O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010b); O’Flaherty
and Sethi (2010a)). Examining trends in lethality and murder within Newark, O’Flaherty and Sethi
(2010a) builds a model on the premise that parties to a dispute possess a preemptive motive in de-
ciding whether to use violence as a means to resolution. More specifically, two randomly matched
individuals must choose a level of lethality with investment in the highest level of lethality coming
at a cost (e.g., choosing between a handgun, knife, or remaining unarmed). If increased lethal-
ity reduces the probability of being killed in an encounter, these conditions naturally give rise to
strategic complementarities as the investment decisions by some parties induces others to invest in
greater lethality as well. The authors find that a decrease in fundamentals such as a decline lethality
costs can produce a discontinuous rise in equilibrium levels of danger. The intense concentration
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of firearm homicide within the urban regions of Missouri could be attributable to expanded access
to secondary markets subsequently responsible for producing large changes in equilibrium dan-
ger. As discussed in Section 1.2, the increasing recovery of new firearms at Missouri crime scenes
could reflect greater investment in lethality and these irreversible investments might subsequently
lead to the type of strategic complementarities discussed in O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010a).
O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010a) also provides an insightful classification for spatial variation
in homicide consisting of “peaceable kingdoms” and “war zones.” Most of the affluent southern
neighborhoods in the City of St. Louis, in addition to the majority of Missouri, would be considered
peaceable kingdoms where the preemptive motive for murder is not particularly strong and does not
lead to large multiplier effects. On the other hand, war zones in places like northern St. Louis and
certain Kansas City neighborhoods possess very large multiplier effects where small reductions in
the costs to access illegal firearm markets can lead to significant changes in gun violence. Given
the extensive residential segregation in Missouri, their model also provides a credible explanation
for differential impact of the permit-to-purchase law repeal on firearm homicide among Black and
White Missourians.
O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010b) provides a similar theoretical model of strategic complementar-
ities, but also addresses one of the main concerns of this analysis pertaining to racial differences
in homicide. Within their framework, two randomly matched individuals engage in a dispute and
belong to one of two groups (i.e., B or W ) and must make a binary decision of whether to resolve
this dispute using violence. While victimization costs and the interaction-specific distribution of
offending costs are commonly known, the offending cost for each individual in the model is pri-
vate information. Similar strategic complementarities exist within their model attributable to the
pre-emptive motive each individual possesses to strike the other party to the dispute. However,
population composition and the nature of segregation influences the type of homicidal interactions
driving equilibrium race-specific murder rates. Assuming that lower offending costs are more
likely among Blacks relative to Whites, the model provides key predictions explaining the higher
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(a) Black-on-Black Murder (b) Black-on-White Murder
(c) White-on-White Murder (d) White-on-Black
Figure 2.4: Race-Specific Murder Rates: Kansas City and the City of St. Louis
equilibrium Black murder rates relative the rates for Whites depending on the characterization of
offending costs.3
Based on imputed data from the Supplementary Homicide Reports, Figure 2.4 shows trends
in race-specific homicide interactions for the City of St. Louis and Kansas City.4 Consistent
with national trends, homicidal interactions are primarily intraracial and largely follow trends in
3In particular, the costs of killing can be described as being either victim-contingent or offender-contingent. For
example, an example of victim-contingent costs involves the costs of killing being lower due to the race/ethnicity of
the victim and remains consistent with the story of underpolicing told in Leovy (2015). Low opportunity costs in
murder serves as an example of offender-contingent costs–with the overrepresentation of Black Americans in prison
and poor socioeconomic circumstances reducing the costs of punishment.
4Homicide characterizations are based on the race of the first offender and first victim for each interaction. With
the overwhelming majority of homicides consisting of dyadic interactions, this is not a severe assumption.
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firearm homicide based on vital statistics data. Black-on-Black murder rates remain several orders
of magnitude greater in both cities compared to any other murder types. Post-repeal Kansas City
Black-on-Black murder increases to more than 50 deaths per 100,000 while reaching nearly 100
deaths per 100,000 in the City of St. Louis. White-on-White murder rates never exceed 20 deaths
per 100,000 throughout the study period for both cities with no significant changes during the
post-repeal period. While interracial murder interracial murder is less common in both cities,
Black-on-White murder remains slightly more elevated during the post-repeal period. One possible
explanation for these patterns in race-specific murder based on O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010b) would
involve offender characteristics playing an important role in determining the costs of killing.
O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010b) also allows for ex-ante investment in firearms before the dispute.
In this scenario, each party to the dispute faces a binary investment decision that reduces one’s
offending costs and requires an upfront payment before the dispute. An interesting comparative
statics exercise addresses the question of what happens to equilibrium race-specific murder rates
as the investment costs approach zero. A reduction in firearm investment costs remains consistent
with increased competition in underground firearm markets or reduced straw purchasing costs–
two possibilities for the Missouri secondary firearm markets after the 2007 permit-to-purchase law
repeal (Cook et al. (2007); Levitt and Venkatesh (2000)). Such a reduction in investment costs
could lead to an amplification of the Black-White murder rate gap as an expanded range of types
with sufficiently low offending costs remains greater for Blacks than Whites.
Theoretical predictions based on models with strategic complementarities are consistent with
post-repeal trends in homicide within the City of St. Louis. Based on data from the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department, Figure 2.5 shows the prevalence of homicide in predominately
Black and White neighborhoods in the City of St. Louis from 2008 to 2015 (Phillips (2015)). One
immediately notices the extraordinary levels of residential segregation with Delmar Boulevard
partitioning the predominately Black neighborhoods in the north from the predominately White
(and relatively more affluent) neighborhoods in the southernmost neighborhoods in the City of
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Figure 2.5: City of St. Louis Homicide: 2008-2015, Phillips (2015)
St. Louis. Moreover, post-repeal homicide remains intensely concentrated in the Black neighbor-
hoods in northern St. Louis with these neighborhoods accounting for the overwhelming majority
of homicides. These patterns in spatial concentration certainly remain consistent with the social
multiplier effects generated by strategic complementarities and offer a compelling explanation for
racial differences in post-repeal gun violence in Missouri.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3: Empirical Strategy
3.1 Generalized Synthetic Control Estimation
The empirical strategy for this study closely follows the generalized synthetic control (GSC)
methodology introduced in Xu (2017) which incorporates the interactive fixed effects model de-
veloped in Bai (2009) into the synthetic control estimation procedure from Abadie et al. (2010).
The synthetic control estimator remains increasingly popular in the policy evaluation literature and
generalizes difference-in-differences estimation in providing a data-driven approach to the weight-
ing of control group data. The ad hoc selection of control units often generated conflicting results
within the empirical gun control literature. Using the adjacent metropolitan areas in Maryland
and Virginia as a control group, Loftin et al. (1991) finds that the 1976 firearm ban in Washing-
ton D.C. reduced firearm homicide mortality by 25 percent and a 23 percent reduction in firearm
suicide over the 1968-1987 period. Reevaluating their findings using Baltimore as the relevant
counterfactual, Britt et al. (1996) no longer find statistical evidence of an increase in either mea-
sure. Construction of the correct counterfactual trends remains crucial to drawing the appropriate
conclusions concerning the impact of the permit-to-purchase law repeal on gun violence.
The GSC estimator extends the synthetic control methodology in important ways for the iden-
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tification of the Missouri PTP repeal effects on firearm homicide. First, GSC estimation allows
for more than one treatment unit and subsequently an analysis of the heterogenous impact of the
PTP repeal at the county-level. Second, synthetic control estimation offers little guidance with
respect to model specification. The absence of any guidance on model specification often leads to
questions on best practices concerning the inclusion of lagged outcomes and interpretation of the
“V-weights.” Linking synthetic control methodology with the interactive fixed effects models from
Bai (2009), GSC estimation overcomes these concerns by performing dimension reduction before
reweighting the control group data and these vectors are smoothed across the control units. This
approach also allows for the counterfactual construction to take advantage of negative correlations
in data in comparison to the nonnegative control weight assumption imposed by synthetic control
estimation.
Third, synthetic control estimation does not allow for the familiar large-sample inference tools.
Instead, Abadie et al. (2010) offers an inference approach based on permutation tests where each
unit from the “donor pool” serves as the pseudo-treatment unit and chosen cutoffs (based on cor-
responding mean squared prediction errors) help in determining the probability of obtaining a
dynamic treatment effect similar to the one observed for the (true) treated unit. A second test in-
volves an evaluation of the distribution of the ratios of post-intervention to pre-intervention mean
squared prediction errors. An important limitation for either approach again involves issues of
model specification as finding the appropriate specification for each pseudo-treatment unit remains
analytically cumbersome. GSC estimation addresses these issues in providing a parametric boot-
strap procedure for the estimation of standard errors with simulations and resampling based on full
control group data.
Lastly, the synthetic control estimator also fails to construct an adequate counterfactual when
covariates and factor loadings of the treated unit lie outside of the convex hull of the control units.
During the early-1990s, the City of St. Louis often led the nation in both overall and Black firearm
homicide–considerably outpacing gun violence in places like Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit (Ka-
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pustin et al. (2017)). These outlier trends subsequently result in a poor pretreatment fit in construct-
ing a synthetic control unit. With the incorporation of intercept shifts through additive fixed effects,
the GSC estimator remains less susceptible to these concerns while also taking advantage of the
full data on controls.
Similar to SC estimation, implementation of the GSC estimator in this case study involves
finding suitable counterfactual firearm homicide trends after the repeal of the permit-to-purchase
law with a crucial identifying assumption being parallel trends during pretreatment period. Let
Hst denote the firearm homicide rate for unit s at time t = 1, 2, . . . , T with the number of pre-
intervention periods given by T0 such that 1 ≤ T0 ≤ T ,Xst a (k×1) vector of observed covariates,
β a (k × 1) vector of unknown parameters, ft a (r × 1) vector of unobserved common factors, λs
a (r × 1) vector of unknown factor loadings, and εst unobserved idiosyncratic shocks with zero
mean. GSC estimation assumes a linear factor model given by:




sft + εst (3.1)
where Dst serves as an indicator taking on a value of one if state s is exposed to the intervention
at time t and zero otherwise. If Hst(1) and Hst(0) denote the potential outcomes, the dynamic







Estimating αt involves the general causal inference exercise of finding the appropriate counter-
factual for unobserved Hst(0). Xu (2017) offers a three-step procedure in implementing the GSC
estimator αGSCt while imposing a normalization and orthogonality constraints on the factors. The
first step involves estimation of an interactive fixed effects model using control group data to obtain
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β̂, F̂ , and Λ̂CO:




(Hs −Xsβ̃ − F̃ λ̃s)′(Hs −Xsβ̃ − F̃ λ̃s)
s.t. F̃ ′F̃ /T = Ir and ˜λCO
′ ˜λCO = diagonal
(3.3)
Using estimates from step one, step two involves minimizing the pretreatment mean squared pre-





(Hs,T0 −Xs,T0 β̂ − F̂T0λ̃s)′(Hs,T0 −Xs,T0 β̂ − F̂T0λ̃s) (3.4)






An important challenge to estimating the impact of the PTP repeal on firearm homicide involves
accounting for unobservable latent factors which could potentially lead to a violation of the parallel
trends assumption. For example, empirical research on firearm homicide often points to the role
of expanding crack cocaine markets and gang activity during the 1980s and early-1990s (Levitt
(2004); Fryer et al. (2013)). Not accounting for such unobservable factors could produce biased
estimation results. While previous research offers some a priori guidance in selecting the number
of factors, Xu (2017) offers a leave-one-out cross-validation procedure which chooses the number
of unobservable factors r that minimizes the MSPE based on the following steps:
• Step 1: For a given number of factors r, estimate β̂ and F̂ via interactive fixed effects
estimation based on control group data
• Step 2a: For every t ≤ T0, hold back all treated unit data at time τ ∈ {1, . . . , T0} and
conduct OLS estimation using the remaining pretreatment data to obtain for every treated














• Step 2b: Predict the treated outcomes at time τ using Ĥ(0)τ = x′τ β̂ + λ̂′−τ f̂τ and save
eτ = H(0)τ − Ĥ(0)τ for every treated unit







• Step 4: Repeat Steps 1-3 for different values of r to obtain each corresponding MSPE
• Step 5: Choose the MSPE-minimizing r∗
As mentioned earlier, GSC estimation also provides a parametric bootstrap procedure allowing
for standard inference techniques–in particular “clustered” standard errors and confidence inter-
vals. The procedure uses the full control group data with draws based on the empirical distribution
of the prediction errors. In particular, Xu (2017) suggests the following procedure:
• Step 1: Begin a loop running B1 times
1. Denote one randomly selected control unit s as the “treated unit” in roundm ∈ {1, . . . , B1}
for t > T0
2. Resample the remaining controls with replacement size NCO to form a new sample
with the pseudo-treatment unit
3. Conduct GSC estimation on this sample to obtain residuals ε̂pm = Hs − Ĥ(0) and end
loop collecting êp = {ε̂p1, ε̂
p




• Step 2: Conduct GSC estimation on the original data to obtain:
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1. ÂTT
2. Coefficients β̂, F̂ , Λ̂CO, andλ̂s∈Treated}
3. Control fitted values ĤCO = {Ĥ1(0), Ĥ2(0), . . . , ĤNCO(0)}
4. Control residuals ê = {ε̂1, ε̂2, . . . , ε̂NCO}
• Step 3: Begin a loop running B2 times
1. Construct a bootstrapped sample S(k) using:
H̃
(k)
i (0) = Ĥi(0) + ε̃
p
i i ∈ Treated (3.6)
H̃
(k)
j (0) = Ĥj(0) + ε̃j j ∈ Controls (3.7)
where ε̃i and ε̃
p
j are randomly selected from e and e




2. Conduct GSC estimation based on S(k) to obtain a new ATT estimate, and add the




• Step 4: Compute the variance of ATT :
















GSC estimation results throughout this study are based on boostrapped samples of N = 2, 000.
3.2 Data and Study Sample Construction
This paper utilizes data from a variety of state-level and county-level sources over the 1981-
2013 study period–yielding 26 years of pre-intervention data and roughly seven years of post-
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intervention data.1 All state-level age-adjusted firearm homicide, nonfirearm homicide, suicide,
and firearm suicide rates (per 100,000) come from death certificate data reported in the United
States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and
Reporting System (WISQARS) Fatal Injury Reports while corresponding county-level data come
from the CDC WONDER database.2 State personal income per capita (logged) data comes from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (measured in 2009 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics consumer price index data). Population estimates, percent living in poverty, proportions of
the population non-Hispanic Black or White, percent of female-headed households, educational
attainment, unemployment rates, and county-level per capita income data come from the Bureau
of the Census Current Population Survey. State-level cocaine-related mortality rates (per 100,000)
come from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Mortality Detail Files.3 Index crime
data comes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).4
In order to avoid potential contamination among the control units, this analysis excludes any
states introducing background check requirements during the study period. This restriction leads to
the exclusion of California, District of Columbia, Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Pennsylvania from the study sample. Data limitations also lead to the exclusion of Hawaii,
1While additional years of post-repeal data remain available, this analysis extends the study period up until the
year 2013 in order avoid concerns regarding any potential effects associated with the events surrounding the Michael
Brown shooting on local law enforcement practices in the greater St. Louis area–more broadly known as the “Ferguson
Effect” (Rosenfeld (2015)).
2The CDC suppresses data for counties and states where low homicide or suicide numbers make certain deaths
identifiable. This exclusion leads to changes in the number of available controls for each analysis.
3Following the work in Fryer et al. (2013), cocaine-related death rates are defined as “accidental poisonings,
suicides, and other deaths for which cocaine was coded as a primary or contributing factor.” For cocaine-related
deaths before 1989, the International Classification of Diseases 9th revision (ICD-9) codes are 8552, 3042, and 3056.
ICD-9 codes 8501-8699, 9501-9529, 9620-9629, 972, 9801-9879, 3050-3054, and 3057-3059 with a secondary code
of 9685 are also included. For cocaine-related deaths after 1998, the International Classification of Diseases 10th
revision (ICD-10) codes are F140-F149, F190-F199, X42, X44, X62, X64, X85, Y12, and Y14 with a secondary code
of T405.
4The FBI UCR data comes from reports to the FBI from law enforcement agencies across the U.S. The FBI uniform
crime index consists of seven crimes: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny
theft, aggravated assault, and motor vehicle theft. The FBI defines murder and nonnegligent manslaughter as the
willful killing of one human being by another–excluding deaths caused by negligence, suicide, accident, justifiable
homicide, attempts to murder, and assaults to murder. This definition will include nearly all homicides as opposed to
the more narrow definition for firearm homicide.
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Maine, North Dakota, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming from the study
sample.5 For the main state-level firearm homicide results, these restrictions lead to a study sample
consisting of 33 states. The county-level sample pulls from the 200 largest U.S. counties in 2000
with complete data in estimating each outcome of interest.
5One exception remains the 2012 repeal of the “one-handgun-per-month” law repeal in Virginia. However, private
handgun sales in Virginia do not require background checks and the results are robust to the exclusion of Virginia from
the sample.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4: Evaluating the Impact of the
Missouri PTP Repeal
4.1 State-Level Gun Ownership Effects
If an increase in post-repeal gun violence remains attributable to expanded access to Missouri
secondary firearm markets, one would expect to observe meaningful changes within the primary
firearm markets as well under the assumption of no significant state-level externalities. Table 4.1
shows the generalized synthetic control estimation results using NICS background checks by gun
type as a proxy for potential sales by federally licensed dealers–controlling for poverty, log per
capita income, unemployment, and percent of the population with less than a high school degree
in addition to state and year fixed effects. Beginning with the first column, these results suggest
that the repeal led to an additional 1,234 handgun background checks per 100,000 and reflects a
190 percent increase relative to the baseline mean. However, the results for background checks
for long guns show a statistically insignificant average increase of 162.30 per 100,000. Given that
the permit-to-purchase law specifically pertained to concealable firearms, these results strongly
suggest that the greatest impact of the repeal occurred within the market for handguns.
39
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Table 4.1: Missouri PTP Repeal NICS Background Check Results (1998-2013)
Variables Handguns Long Guns
PTP Repeal 1234.00 162.30
(341.20) (342.40)
Poverty Rate 2.34 13.68
(5.30) (14.11)
Unemployment Rate 8.42 -20.17
(14.80) (30.73)
Ln(GDP Per Capita) 2754.74 4421.41
(1336.81) (1705.18)
Education: Less Than High School -37.61 30.80
(28.36) (46.36)
Treatment Units 1 1
Control Units 33 33
Unobserved Factors 2 0
MSPE 9126.46 35138.13
Mean 648.43 2368.49
Note: All NICS background check rates are presented per 100,000 individuals in the population. Estimation includes
state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered at the state-level with bootstraps
based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
Figure 4.1 also shows they dynamic treatment effect evidence corresponding with the back-
ground check results provided in Table 4.1. Figure 4.1a provides the estimated counterfactual
trends in handgun background checks, relative to the actual trends for Missouri, and Figure 4.1b
gives the dynamic treatment effect evidence with estimated 95 percent confidence intervals. The
figures confirm the previous results in showing the divergence of Missouri trends in potential hand-
gun sales from the estimated counterfactual after the 2007 permit-to-purchase law repeal. This
estimated average treatment effect sharply increases over the first few years of the repeal before
reaching a steady state of roughly 1,500 handgun checks through 2011 and rising slightly more
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(a) Handgun Checks (b) Handgun Checks Effect
(c) Long Gun Checks (d) Long Gun Checks Effect
Figure 4.1: Missouri NICS Background Check Results
Notes: Figure includes estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for poverty,
log per capita income, unemployment, percent of the population with less than a high school degree, state effects, and
year fixed effects.
heading into the last few years of the post-repeal period. Figures 4.1c-4.1d provides similar dy-
namic treatment effect evidence for potential long gun sales in Missouri and confirms the previous
findings that the repeal appears to not greatly impact the market for long guns.
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(a) Estimated Latent Factors (b) Estimated Factor Loadings
Figure 4.2: Missouri Handgun Background Check Results: Latent Factors and Factor Loadings
Notes: Estimated latent factors and factor loadings comes from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling
for poverty, log per capita income, unemployment, percent of the population with less than a high school degree, state
effects, and year fixed effects. Model specification based on cross-validation results minimizing the mean squared
prediction error (MSPE) over the pretreatment period.
Focusing on the handgun estimation results again in Table 4.1, cross-validation also leads to
the selection of a model with two unobserved factors. Figure 4.2a shows the two estimated la-
tent factors while Figure 4.2b provides a plot of the associated estimated factor loadings. While
one must exercise some caution in interpreting these factors, the first factor captures a gradual
increase in potential handgun sales after 2007 and this factor increases sharply during the latter
years of the post-repeal period. Other than observing a decrease in handgun background checks
during the early 2000s, interpretation of the second factor remains less clear. Figure 4.2b sheds
some additional insight on these two factors by plotting the corresponding factor loadings for both
Missouri and the control group. One immediate observation involves the estimated factor loadings
for Missouri residing within the convex hull of the control units and provides some credibility for
the generalized synthetic control estimation results. Another interesting observation from the plot
points to the fact that states with weaker gun laws (e.g., Arkansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia)
generally have larger factor loadings on the first factor. Altogether, these results provide strong
evidence that the Missouri permit-to-purchase law repeal led to a significant increase in potential
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Total Suicide Rate 1.24
(0.1048)
Ln(Income Per Capita) 8.00
(5.32)
Female-Headed Households (%) 1.30
(0.5520)







Notes: Data on (crude) total suicide rates are presented per 100,000 individuals in the population. Estimation includes
county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered at the county-level with
bootstraps based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
handgun sales within the primary firearm markets.
4.2 County-Level Gun Ownership Effects
An important question remains whether the PTP repeal led to an increase in gun proliferation
across local secondary firearm markets within the state of Missouri. Figure 4.4 provides county-
CHAPTER 4. EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE MISSOURI PTP REPEAL 44
(a) FSS: All Counties (b) FSS: Jackson County
(c) FSS: St. Louis County (d) FSS: City of St. Louis
Figure 4.3: Missouri County-Level FSS Results
Notes: Figure includes estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for overall
suicide rates, log per capita income, percent of female-headed households, educational attainment less than high
school, county effects, and year fixed effects.
level dynamic treatment effects for the impact of the PTP repeal on FSS with estimation results
in Table 4.2. This specification controls for total suicide rates, log per capita income, percent
of female-headed households, and percent of the population with less than a high school degree
in addition to county and year fixed effects. Despite yielding a fairly noisy estimate, Table 4.2
provides evidence of an average seven percentage point increase in FSS across Jackson County, St.
Louis County, and the City of St. Louis with Figure 4.4 showing increased gun proliferation
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(a) FSS: All Counties (b) FSS: Jackson County
(c) FSS: St. Louis County (d) FSS: City of St. Louis
Figure 4.4: Missouri County-Level FSS Effects
Notes: Figure includes treatment effects from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for overall sui-
cide rates, log per capita income, percent of female-headed households, educational attainment less than high school,
county effects, and year fixed effects. Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals with bootstrapped stan-
dard errors clustered at the county-level based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
peaking a few years after the repeal. Cross-validation also leads to a model specification with
one estimated latent factor shown in Figure 4.5. While interpretation of this factor remains less
straightforward, this figure clearly shows a steady increase in FSS trends during the early 1990s
before rising again after 2000.
The autonomy possessed by each sheriff’s office in screening permit-to-purchase applications
could imply important county-level heterogeneity in the effects of the PTP law repeal. Figures
4.4b-4.4d show considerable heterogeneity in the effects of the PTP repeal on county-level gun
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Figure 4.5: Missouri County-Level Gun Ownership Results: Latent Factors
Notes: Estimated latent factor comes from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for overall suicide
rates, log per capita income, percent of female-headed households, educational attainment less than high school,
county effects, and year fixed effects. Model specification based on cross-validation results minimizing the mean
squared prediction error (MSPE) over the pretreatment period.
ownership across the three treatment units. However, these results are primarily driven by the
sharp increase in FSS within the City of St. Louis. In particular, the dynamic FSS treatment effect
shows a large and significant 60 percentage point increase over the 2011-2012 period. While both
Jackson County and St. Louis County also experience post-repeal increases in gun prevalence, the
statistical evidence remains less conclusive.
The significant expansion of secondary firearm markets within the City of St. Louis remains
consistent with the substantial number of crime guns traced back to the area in the ATF firearm
trace reports data. While the extent to which an increase in the FSS proxy truly reflects changes
in gun ownership among individuals associated with criminal activity remains an open question,
previous empirical work suggests that the measure captures both legal gun ownership and some
aspects of illicit firearm ownership. The fact that survey measures often find significant racial
differences in reported gun ownership and suicide remains substantially higher among White
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Table 4.3: Missouri PTP Repeal Firearm Homicide Results
Variables All Age Age 15-24 Age 25-44 Age 45+
PTP Repeal 0.9716 2.83 1.14 0.2599
(0.6278) (2.47) (1.75) (0.2169)
Poverty Rate -0.0292 -0.1536 0.0590 -0.0106
(0.0159) (0.0887) (0.0663) (0.0134)
Unemployment Rate -0.0390 -0.4834 -0.1223 0.0419
(0.0372) (0.1975) (0.1214) (0.0285)
Cocaine-Related Overdose Rate 0.0356 0.1597 0.0543 0.0089
(0.0221) (0.1219) (0.0721) (0.0110)
FSS 0.0122 0.0116 0.1083 0.0094
(0.0372) (0.0592) (0.0417) (0.0107)
Treatment Units 1 1 1 1
Control Units 33 26 29 25
Unobserved Factors 2 1 0 1
MSPE 0.2497 6.80 0.4841 0.1376
Mean 5.77 13.98 9.21 2.68
Note: Data on cocaine-related overdose and all firearm homicide rates are presented per 100,000 individuals in the
population. Estimation includes state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered
at the state-level with bootstraps based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
Americans might contribute to the noisy relationship between the PTP repeal and the FSS measure
(Parker et al. (2017)).1
4.3 State-Level Firearm Homicide Effects
The 2007 permit-to-purchase law led to significant changes in Missouri firearm homicide trends
with these effects varying considerably across age groups. Table 4.3 provides generalized synthetic
control estimation results by age group while Figures 4.6-4.7 showing the corresponding dynamic
treatment effects associated with the repeal. All state-level specifications control for (race-specific)
poverty, (race-specific) unemployment, cocaine-related overdose rates, FSS, state effects, and year
1Contrary to homicide trends, White Missourians make up approximately 85 percent of the state while accounting
for nearly 93 percent of all suicides (Missouri Institute of Mental Health (2015))
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(a) Firearm Homicide: Overall (b) Firearm Homicide: 15-24
(c) Firearm Homicide: 25-44 (d) Firearm Homicide: 45 and Older
Figure 4.6: Missouri Firearm Homicide Results
Notes: Figure includes estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for poverty
rate, unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects.
effects. GSC estimation yields an average treatment effect of 0.9716 with a standard error of
0.6278. The largest increase in post-repeal firearm homicide occurs among victims ages 15-24
with an additional 2.83 deaths per 100,000 and the average treatment effect decreases with age.
The dynamic treatment effect results show that the greatest impact of the PTP repeal on firearm
homicide occurs within the first few years of the post-repeal period. Overall firearm homicide
peaks in 2008 with a significant and positive increase of 1.73 deaths per 100,000 in 2008. Similarly,
firearm homicide among victims ages 15-24 at over six deaths per 100,000 from 2009-2010
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(a) Firearm Homicide: Overall (b) Firearm Homicide: 15-24
(c) Firearm Homicide: 25-44 (d) Firearm Homicide: 45 and Older
Figure 4.7: Missouri Firearm Homicide Effects
Notes: Figure includes treatment effects from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for poverty rate,
unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects. Dashed lines represent
95 percent confidence intervals with bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the state-level based on a sample of
N = 2, 000.
and victims older than 45 experience a slight increase of 1.13 additional deaths in 2008.
Focusing on the overall firearm homicide results, the cross-validation procedure within GSC
estimation yields a specification with two estimated latent factors. Figure 4.8a shows the estimated
unobserved factors for overall firearm homicide over the study period while Figure 4.8b plots the
estimated factor loadings for Missouri and each control state. While some caution remains
necessary in providing a direct interpretation of the estimated factors, one fairly clear observa-
tion points to the importance of the crime epidemic during the early 1990s in explaining firearm
homicide trends up until the early 2000s when states throughout the U.S. experienced historical
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(a) Estimated Latent Factors (b) Estimated Factor Loadings
Figure 4.8: Missouri Handgun Firearm Homicide Results: Latent Factors and Factor Loadings
Notes: Estimated latent factor comes from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for poverty rate, un-
employment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects. Model specification based
on cross-validation results minimizing the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) over the pretreatment period.
declines in crime rates. Indeed, Figure 4.8b illustrates that states with significant racial disparities
in homicide such as Illinois, New York, Louisiana, and Mississippi possess some of the largest
factor loadings on the second factor. Interpretation of the first factor remains less clear, but results
from both figures suggests an upward trend in firearm homicide among states with either relatively
lax gun laws (e.g., Delaware and Ohio) or states with neighbors possessing less restrictive gun
control laws (e.g., New Jersey).
Similar to national trends, substantial racial differences in firearm homicide exist within the
state of Missouri and estimation across these groups highlight the disparate impact of the PTP
repeal. Table 4.4 provides evidence from generalized synthetic control estimation on the varying
impact of the PTP repeal across race and age groups. The first column suggests that the overall
firearm among Black victims increased significantly by an average 5.17 additional deaths per
100,000 over the post-repeal period. However, estimation results by age group also emphasizes
the importance of the permit-to-purchase law for Black youth homicide. The large and significant
28.97 treatment effect among young Black firearm homicide victims ages 15-24 suggests that much
of the increase in Missouri firearm homicide trends remains attributable to greater illicit access to
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Table 4.4: Missouri PTP Repeal Firearm Homicide Results by Race and Age
Variables Black White Black (15-24) Black (25-44) White (25-44)
PTP Repeal 5.17 0.1226 28.97 8.18 0.3477
(3.19) (0.1728) (11.68) (5.97) (0.6255)
Poverty Rate1 0.0416 0.0205 0.9003 0.0947 -0.0064
(0.1508) (0.0546) (0.4384) (0.3605) (0.1660)
Unemployment Rate1 -0.0859 -0.0536 -0.3242 -0.0014 -0.0624
(0.2162) (0.0502) (0.7152) (0.4923) (0.1676)
Cocaine-Related Overdose 0.1103 0.0132 -0.0958 0.5267 0.0560
(0.1163) (0.0096) (0.4151) (0.3052) (0.0294)
FSS 0.0060 0.0132 0.2233 0.1902 0.0311
(0.0440) (0.0063) (0.1621) (0.1226) (0.0185)
Treatment Units 1 1 1 1 1
Control Units 24 28 20 22 21
Unobserved Factors 3 2 2 1 1
MSPE 18.62 0.0500 459.65 50.93 0.2610
Mean 32.00 2.26 86.67 52.04 3.79
Note: Data on cocaine-related overdose and all firearm homicide rates are presented per 100,000 individuals in the
population. Estimation includes state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered
at the state-level with bootstraps based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
1 Poverty and unemployment rates are race-specific when appropriate.
firearms. Similarly, firearm homicide increases by an average 8.18 deaths per 100,000 for Black
victims ages 25-44. White firearm homicide results also suggest a small post-repeal increase of
0.1226 for the overall rate and 0.3477 among White Missourians ages 25-44. However,
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(a) Black Firearm Homicide: Overall (b) Black Firearm Homicide: 15-24
(c) Black Firearm Homicide: 25-44
Figure 4.9: Missouri Black Firearm Homicide Results
Notes: Figure includes estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for Black
poverty rate, Black unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects.
the corresponding standard errors also present less conclusive statistical evidence concerning the
average post-repeal effect for White Missourians.
Figures 4.9-4.11 also provide dynamic evidence of the impact of the PTP repeal across race and
age groups. These results again show that the greatest impact of the PTP repeal occurs within the
first few years of the post-repeal period. A sharp spike in overall Black firearm homicide occurs in
2008 and reflects an additional 12.03 deaths per 100,000. Young Black firearm homicide victims
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(a) Black Firearm Homicide: Overall (b) Black Firearm Homicide: 15-24
(c) Black Firearm Homicide: 25-44
Figure 4.10: Missouri Black Firearm Homicide Effects
Notes: Figure includes treatment effects from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for Black poverty
rate, Black unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects. Dashed lines
represent 95 percent confidence intervals with bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the state-level based on a
sample of N = 2, 000.
ages 15-24 account for an extensive amount of the early post-repeal gun violence and peaks at an
additional 55 deaths per 100,000 by 2010. Similar treatment effect estimates for Black victims
ages 25-44 range from 15.30 in 2008 to 12.5 by 2010. Limited dynamic findings for White firearm
homicide victims ages 25-44 also show a smaller yet significant increase of 1.89 additional deaths
during the first full year of the repeal.
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(a) White Firearm Homicide: Overall (b) White Firearm Homicide: 25-44
(c) White Firearm Homicide: Overall Effects (d) White Firearm Homicide: 25-44 Effects
Figure 4.11: Missouri White Firearm Homicide Results
Notes: The top figures include estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling
for White poverty rate, White unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed
effects with treatment effects in the bottom two figures. Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals with
bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the state-level based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
In understanding the importance of unobservable factors violating any parallel trends assumption,
Figure 4.12 shows the estimated latent factors for overall Black firearm homicide while Table 4.5
shows the estimated factor loadings for each state. Similar to overall trends, the second and third
factors capture a strong upward trend in Black firearm homicide during the crime epidemic of the
late-1980s and early-1990s. Comparing these trends with the estimated factor loadings in Table
4.5, the third factor also shows a modest upward trend in Black firearm homicide among states
such as Missouri, Illinois, and Louisiana. While interpretation of the first factor again remains
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Figure 4.12: Missouri Black Firearm Homicide Results: Latent Factors
Notes: Estimated latent factors come from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for Black poverty rate,
Black unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects. Model specification
based on cross-validation results minimizing the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) over the pretreatment period.
less straightforward, one observes a similar combination of states suffering from less restrictive
gun laws and substantial contemporary increases in Black firearm homicide. Overall, state-level
results yield strong evidence that the permit-to-purchase law repeal led to a significant increase in
firearm homicide with a disproportionate impact felt by young Black Missourians.
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Table 4.5: Missouri Black Firearm Homicide Results: Factor Loadings
State Factor 1 State Factor 2 State Factor 3
1. Delaware 2.41 1. Kansas 2.45 1. Missouri 2.06
2. New Jersey 1.98 2. Wisconsin 1.57 2. Illinois 1.05
3. Kentucky 0.8189 3. Minnesota 1.49 3. Louisiana 0.9978
4. South Carolina 0.8131 4. Arizona 1.13 4. Wisconsin 0.9582
5. Ohio 0.7962 5. Louisiana 0.9941 5. Arkansas 0.6211
6. Massachusetts 0.7316 6. Illinois 0.8459 6. Texas 0.5980
7. Oklahoma 0.6384 7. Nevada 0.8123 7. Oklahoma 0.5444
8. Wisconsin 0.3430 8. Missouri 0.5659 8. Ohio 0.4395
9. Virginia 0.2422 9. Virginia 0.2253 9. Massachusetts 0.3921
10. North Carolina 0.1716 10. North Carolina 0.0941 10. Michigan 0.3653
11. Minnesota 0.1194 11. Mississippi -0.0278 11. New York 0.3630
12. Kansas 0.0809 12. Arkansas -0.0823 12. New Jersey 0.0894
13. Arizona 0.0087 13. Massachusetts -0.1619 13. Mississippi 0.0891
14. Illinois 0.0001 14. Kentucky -0.2145 14. Kansas -0.0316
15. Mississippi -0.0300 15. Alabama -0.3586 15. Minnesota -0.0770
16. Alabama -0.0679 16. New York -0.4922 16. Virginia -0.1667
17. Louisiana -0.1266 17. South Carolina -0.5148 17. Delaware -0.2527
18. Arkansas -0.3732 18. Ohio -0.7548 18. Alabama -0.2783
19. Georgia -0.5176 19. Oklahoma -0.8101 19. North Carolina -0.3411
20. Michigan -0.8873 20. New Jersey -0.8251 20. South Carolina -0.3443
21. New York -0.9011 21. Delaware -0.8341 21. Georgia -0.5811
22. Florida -1.23 22. Georgia -0.9152 22. Florida -0.5928
23. Nevada -1.41 23. Michigan -1.16 23. Kentucky -1.09
24. Missouri -1.59 24. Texas -1.19 24. Arizona -1.37
25. Texas -2.02 25. Florida -1.84 25. Nevada -3.45
Notes: Estimated factor loadings come from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for Black poverty
rate, Black unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects. Model speci-
fication based on cross-validation results minimizing the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) over the pretreatment
period.
4.4 County-Level Heterogeneity in Firearm Homicide
The overwhelming concentration of firearm homicide in urban areas of Missouri, in addition
to the autonomy held by sheriffs’ offices in screening permit applications before 2007, raises an
important question concerning the differential impact of the PTP repeal at the county-level. Given
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Table 4.6: Missouri County-Level PTP Repeal Firearm Homicide Results
Variables Firearm Homicide Black Firearm Homicide
PTP Repeal 1.81 6.27
(1.47) (3.22)
Poverty Rate1 0.0178 -0.0688
(0.1735) (0.5212)
Unemployment Rate1 -0.2410 0.4782
(0.0888) (0.6485)




Treatment Units 3 3
Control Units 33 14
Unobserved Factors 4 4
MSPE 16.56 63.34
Mean 14.90 37.06
Note: All firearm homicide rates are presented per 100,000 individuals in the population. Estimation includes county
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered at the county-level with bootstraps
based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
1 Poverty and unemployment rates are race-specific when appropriate.
data limitations and the state-level results highlighting the significant impact of the repeal on Black
firearm homicide, Table 4.6 shows county-level estimation results for overall firearm homicide and
Black firearm homicide–focusing specifically on Jackson County, St. Louis County, and the City of
St. Louis as treatment units. These specifications remain similar to the state-level models with the
Black population proportion instead of the cocaine-related mortality rates. County-level estimation
reveals a slightly larger average treatment effect of 1.81 deaths per 100,000 for overall homicide.
The 6.27 Black firearm homicide estimate remains slightly larger than the corresponding
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(a) Firearm Homicide: All Counties (b) Firearm Homicide: Jackson County
(c) Firearm Homicide: St. Louis County (d) Firearm Homicide: City of St. Louis
Figure 4.13: Missouri County-Level Firearm Homicide Results
Notes: Figure includes estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for poverty
rate, unemployment rate, Black percent of the population, FSS, county effects, and year fixed effects.
state-level estimate of 5.17 and remains significant–once again providing evidence showing the
importance of the PTP law for gun violence in the more urban regions of the state.
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(a) Firearm Homicide: All Counties (b) Firearm Homicide: Jackson County
(c) Firearm Homicide: St. Louis County (d) Firearm Homicide: City of St. Louis
Figure 4.14: Missouri County-Level Firearm Homicide Effects
Notes: Figure includes treatment effects from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for poverty rate,
unemployment rate, Black percent of the population, FSS, county effects, and year fixed effects. Dashed lines represent
95 percent confidence intervals with bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the county-level based on a sample of
N = 2, 000.
The dynamic treatment effects shown in Figures 4.13-4.14 also demonstrate the higher levels
of gun violence during the early years of the post-repeal period. The 2009-2010 period remains
characterized by a large and significant increase of approximately four overall firearm homicide
deaths. Overall gun violence within the City of St. Louis grew by nearly 10-11 additional deaths
per 100,000 in the early years of the repeal. County-level Black firearm homicide estimates in
Figures 4.15-4.16 show substantial increases in gun violence across all three areas with average
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(a) Black Firearm Homicide: All Counties (b) Black Firearm Homicide: Jackson County
(c) Black Firearm Homicide: St. Louis County (d) Black Firearm Homicide: City of St. Louis
Figure 4.15: Missouri County-Level Black Firearm Homicide Results
Notes: Figure includes estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for Black
poverty rate, Black unemployment rate, Black percent of the population, FSS, county effects, and year fixed effects.
increases of 10-11 deaths over 2008-2010 period. Both Jackson County and St. Louis County show
large early post-repeal increases well over 10 overall firearm deaths while the PTP law repeal led
to an additional 17-18 Black firearm homicide deaths per 100,000 from 2008-2009. These results
provide conclusive evidence that the burden of less restrictive access to firearms largely falls on
urban Black communities within the state of Missouri.
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(a) Black Firearm Homicide: All Counties (b) Black Firearm Homicide: Jackson County
(c) Black Firearm Homicide: St. Louis County (d) Black Firearm Homicide: City of St. Louis
Figure 4.16: Missouri County-Level Black Firearm Homicide Effects
Notes: Figure includes treatment effects from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for Black poverty
rate, Black unemployment rate, Black percent of the population, FSS, county effects, and year fixed effects. Dashed
lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals with bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the county-level based
on a sample of N = 2, 000.
4.5 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analyses
A natural question for the identification strategy utilized in this paper involves potential exter-
nalities associated with the Missouri PTP repeal. One such externality could involve gun trafficking
opportunities for Missouri secondary markets in border states with more stringent gun laws. For
example, the Missouri PTP repeal might have led to Missouri becoming a net exporter of firearms
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Table 4.7: Missouri Firearm Trace Recovery in Border States: 2006-2013 (%)
Year Missouri Arkansas Illinois Iowa Kansas Kentucky Nebraska Oklahoma Tennessee
2006 30.65 1.75 0.63 1.26 7.18 0.00 0.94 0.64 0.00
2007 33.33 0.96 0.84 0.60 7.99 0.00 0.78 0.37 0.00
2008 35.64 0.94 0.86 1.39 6.92 0.00 1.18 1.18 0.00
2009 40.43 0.93 1.08 1.45 6.33 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00
2010 41.19 1.65 1.00 1.08 8.31 0.00 1.06 0.73 0.00
2011 48.24 0.90 1.43 1.30 6.71 0.00 1.12 1.09 0.00
2012 47.96 0.76 1.37 1.49 6.98 0.36 1.45 0.53 0.00
2013 50.34 1.05 1.69 1.49 6.50 0.00 1.87 1.06 0.00
Source: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Firearm Tracing System
to secondary markets in other states–in particular those states bordering Missouri. Such a change
might lead to an increase in firearm homicide rates and subsequently a heightened law enforcement
presence in those states. In estimating a gravity relationship using the 2009 ATF trace data, Knight
(2013) finds evidence suggesting that firearms tend to flow from secondary markets in states with
weaker laws to states with tougher ones.
Table 4.7 examines the flow of firearms originally purchased from a Missouri FFL dealer to
crimes scenes within Missouri and its eight border states–with states such as Illinois, Iowa, and
Nebraska each having stronger firearm laws than Missouri over the post-repeal period. While Mis-
souri accounts for less than one third of its total firearm traces in the year before the PTP repeal,
this number increases to 50.34 percent by 2013. This large increase in the domestic recovery of
Missouri firearms suggests that the PTP repeal had important consequences for illegal secondary
markets within the state. Moreover, none of the states bordering Missouri experience any signifi-
cant changes in Missouri firearm traces within their borders over the post-repeal period. The lack
of a notable increase in the trafficking of firearms to states outside of Missouri remains consis-
tent with previous findings suggesting that social connections, and subsequently straw purchasing
behavior, play a more salient role in the proliferation of firearms into criminal activity than large
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scale gun trafficking operations (Cook et al. (2007); Cook et al. (2015); Cook et al. (2015)).
In order to avoid potential contamination among controls, further analyses based on the state-
level samples involve generalized synthetic control estimation excluding any of Missouri’s border
states from the control group. Carrying out the analysis in this manner leads to some changes
in the magnitude of certain estimated coefficients for Black firearm homicide and pre-treatment
mean squared prediction errors, but the qualitative conclusions remain the same.2 In particular, the
coefficient on overall Black firearm homicide increases to 7.34 while the corresponding estimate
for Black youth ages 15-24 falls to 16.86 with a standard error of 9.47. The estimate for Black
firearm homicide for victims ages 25-44 also increases to 10.14 with a standard error of 5.73 and
reinforces the conclusion that the repeal’s greatest impact occurs among young Black Missourians.
Table 4.8 assesses whether the PTP law repeal influenced nonfirearm homicide rates or any
other forms of criminal activity captured in the FBI UCR data. Based on mortality data, state-
level GSC estimation yields a positive estimate of 0.1140 nonfirearm deaths per 100,000 with a
standard error of 0.5108. These findings suggest that post-repeal homicide within Missouri re-
mains exclusive to firearm homicide and provides additional evidence that this violence remains
attributable to greater gun proliferation within the state. The remaining rows of Table 4.8 show
similar estimation results across the seven index crimes reported to the FBI by local law enforce-
ment agencies. Aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, and motor vehicle theft all show positive
post-repeal effects although each remain statistically insignificant. Estimates for burglary, larceny
theft, and property crime show statistically insignificant negative effects. With an exception for the
1.23 increase in murder and non-negligent manslaughter, this study finds no conclusive statistical
evidence suggesting that the PTP repeal led to an increase in any other crime rates.
In the absence of any potential “Ferguson Effect,” an extension of the post-repeal period up
until 2016 reflects an increase in both gun proliferation and firearm homicide throughout the state
of Missouri–with these results being qualitatively similar to the core results presented in previous
2Results available upon request to the author.
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Table 4.8: Missouri PTP Repeal: Robustness Check Results
Outcomes PTP Repeal
Non-Firearm Homicide Rate: CDC 0.1140
(0.5108)
Murder Rate and Non-Negligent Homicide: UCR 1.23
(0.6053)
Aggravated Assault Rate: UCR 34.18
(38.05)
Forcible Rape Rate: UCR 1.81
(2.87)
Robbery Rate: UCR 0.9267
(10.51)
Burglary Rate: UCR -10.13
(61.25)
Larceny Theft Rate: UCR -130.70
(241.10)
Property Crime Rate: UCR -211.60
(312.80)
Motor Vehicle Theft Rate: UCR 0.16
(138.4)
Note: Specifications include poverty, unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, and fraction of suicides
committed with a firearm. Estimation includes geographic unit (i.e., county-level or state-level) and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered at the geographic level (i.e., county-level or state-level)
with bootstraps based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
sections. Based on generalized synthetic control estimation, Table 4.9 reproduces earlier results in
the second column of the table using 2013 as the last post-repeal year and the extended results up
until 2016 in the third column. The average treatment effect estimates for both state-level NICS
background checks measures and the county-level FSS measure are slightly larger after extending
the post-repeal period to 2016. While the effect for long guns remains statistically insignificant,
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Table 4.9: Missouri PTP Repeal: 2007-2016 Post-Intervention Period
Outcomes PTP Repeal PTP Repeal
2007-2013 2007-2016
NICS Handgun Checks (State-Level) 1234.00 1259 .00
(341.20) (434.80)
NICS Long Gun Checks (State-Level) 162.30 208.50
(342.40) (364.50)
FSS (County-Level) 6.94 7.24
(4.48) (4.02)
Firearm Homicide: Overall (State-level) 0.9716 1.51
(0.6278) (0.7139)
Firearm Homicide: Ages 15-24 (State-level) 2.83 4.12
(2.47) (2.63)
Firearm Homicide: Ages 25-44 (State-level) 1.14 1.85
(1.75) (1.82)
Firearm Homicide: Ages 45 and Older (State-level) 0.2599 0.4463
(0.2169) (0.2446)
Black Firearm Homicide: Overall (State-level) 5.17 8.36
(3.19) (3.71)
Black Firearm Homicide: Ages 15-24 (State-level) 28.97 30.94
(11.68) (10.53)
Black Firearm Homicide: Ages 25-44 (State-level) 8.18 15.36
(5.97) (6.69)
White Firearm Homicide: Overall (State-level) 0.1226 0.2906
(0.1728) (0.2581)
White Firearm Homicide: Ages 25-44 (State-level) 0.3477 0.5109
(0.6255) (0.6505)
Firearm Homicide: Overall (County-level) 1.81 2.06
(1.47) (2.25)
Black Firearm Homicide: Overall (County-level) 6.27 9.61
(3.22) (3.98)
Note: All NICS background check rates are presented per 100,000 individuals in the population. State-level NICS background check specifications
control for poverty, log per capita income, unemployment, percent of the population with less than a high school degree, state effects, and year
fixed effects. The county-level FSS specification controls for overall suicide rates, log per capita income, percent of female-headed households,
educational attainment less than high school, county effects, and year fixed effects. All state-level firearm homicide specifications control
for (race-specific) poverty rate, (race-specific) unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects.
County-level firearm homicide specification control for (race-specific) poverty rate, (race-specific) unemployment rate, Black percent of the
population, FSS, county effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered at the geographic level (i.e.,
county-level or state-level) with bootstraps based on a sample of N = 2, 000.
the increase in (potential) handgun background checks continue to serve as an overwhelming pres-
ence in the post-repeal primary gun markets in Missouri with an average treatment effect of 1,259
checks per 100,000.
Table 4.9 also shows an increase in the state-level average treatment effects across all age
groups with overall firearm homicide increasing from 0.9716 to 1.51 additional deaths per 100,000
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(a) Black Firearm Homicide (b) Black Firearm Homicide: Effects
Figure 4.17: Missouri Black Firearm Homicide Results (1981-2016)
Notes: Figure includes estimated counterfactuals from generalized synthetic control estimation controlling for Black
poverty rate, Black unemployment rate, cocaine-related overdose rate, FSS, state effects, and year fixed effects.
Missourians. More importantly, racial disparities in firearm homicide remain persistent over the
10 year period post-repeal period as Black gun violence continues to dominate the state-level
trends for Missouri. Compared to the baseline mean 86.67, the now 36 percent increase in firearm
homicide among Black Missourians ages 15-24 continues to highlight the significant contribution
of gun violence among Black youth to the state’s post-repeal narrative. The average treatment
effect for Black Missourians ages 25-44 nearly doubles over the 10 year period to 15.36, and
relative to the baseline mean of 52.04, reflects a 30 percent increase within this group. Consistent
with earlier findings, the analysis yields no statistical evidence of an increase in state-level White
firearm homicide although both average treatment effects are larger after accounting for recent
trends.
Lastly, an inspection of the corresponding dynamic treatment effect evidence sheds additional
insight regarding the substantial firearm homicide victimization taking place among young Black
Missourians. Figure 4.17 provides the dynamic average treatment effect for state-level Black
firearm homicide in Missouri after including three additional years of post-repeal data. While
earlier results suggest a consistent decline in Black firearm homicide up until 2013, these trends re-
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main short-lived as gun violence increases sharply to over 40 Black firearm homicides per 100,000
by 2015. In particular, the roughly 20 additional firearm homicide deaths in 2015 reflects a 63
percent increase increase in gun violence relative to the baseline and remains comparable to the
historic peak in Black firearm homicide during the early 1990s. The generalized synthetic con-
trol estimation results again show that these trends are driven by the extraordinary levels of gun
violence taking place within the City of St. Louis.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5: Conclusion
Using the 2007 repeal of the Missouri permit-to-purchase law as a natural experiment, this
paper provides evidence of an increase in the proliferation of firearms and strong evidence of an
increase in firearm homicide within Missouri. The repeal led to an increase of 1,234 handgun back-
ground checks per 100,000 throughout the state of Missouri. The absence of statistical evidence
supporting an increase in long guns suggests that the permit-to-purchase law repeal primarily influ-
enced the primary market for handguns. Results concerning the county-level FSS proxy show an
average treatment effect of a seven percentage points across Jackson County, St. Louis County, and
the City of St. Louis. The increase in local gun proliferation occurs at a time in which within-state
firearms appear at crimes scenes more quickly and the proportion of crime guns from other states
remains consistently low throughout the post-repeal period. These results mirror the geographic
distribution of crime guns within the ATF firearm trace reports with the City of St. Louis showing
the greatest increase in firearm proliferation through local secondary markets.
This paper also finds evidence of a modest increase in overall firearm homicide throughout the
state of Missouri with much of the gun violence driven by a disproportionate increase in firearm
homicide among young Black Missourians. Statewide non-Hispanic Black firearm homicide in-
creases by an average of 5.17 deaths per 100,000 (17 percent) during the post-repeal period and
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increases by roughly 29 deaths per 100,000 (33 percent) among Black youth ages 15-24. The
average treatment effect for Black firearm homicide in Missouri translates into approximately an
additional 260 Black deaths over 2008-2013 period. This analysis yields no statistical evidence
of a corresponding increase among non-Hispanic White Missourians. Furthermore, these changes
in firearm homicide occur in the absence of any significant changes in nonfirearm homicide and
other reported crimes not involving murder. Thus, this paper provides new evidence concerning
the differential impact of state-level gun control laws on firearm homicide across racial groups.
Considerable heterogeneity also exists in the effects of the permit-to-purchase law repeal on
firearm homicide across counties and cities in the state of Missouri. Black firearm homicide in-
creases by an average 6.27 deaths per 100,000 (17 percent) across Jackson County, St. Louis
County, and City of St. Louis. County-level results suggests that the largest increase occurred
within the City of St. Louis with an increase in Black firearm homicide rates of 7.97 deaths fol-
lowed by 5.92 deaths in Jackson County and 4.91 deaths in St. Louis County. Similar to the
state-level findings, these results suggest that the adverse effects of the PTP repeal fall dispropor-
tionately on urban Black communities within the state of Missouri.
The heightened levels of Missouri gun violence led to the introduction of several interventions
by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and other parties interested in reducing firearm homi-
cide. In the absence of any potential Ferguson effect, these short-term interventions could explain
the limited post-repeal decline in gun violence within the City of St. Louis from 2010-2013. Mares
and Blackburn (2012) assesses the impact of Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS) technol-
ogy usage on gun violence in northern neighborhoods within the City of St Louis from August
2008 until October 2009. AGLS technology, commonly sold by companies such as Shotspotter,
triangulates the sounds of gunshots using GIS software and forward the location information to
patrol officers. The police department specifically chose the Wells/Goodfellow and (parts of the)
Hamilton Heights neighborhoods given the overwhelming prevalence gun violence within these
areas in addition to the costs associated with implementing AGLS technology–nearly $200,000-
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250,000 per square mile. Using monthly data from the Uniform Crime Reports and “shots fired”
reports from residents, the authors find that AGLS technology implementation led to a 49 percent
decline in gun shot reports by residents. However, the authors find no statistical evidence of a
decrease in gun-related crime within these neighborhoods. While control group selection by the
authors remains questionable (i.e., the authors chose four surrounding neighborhoods as control
units based only on comparability in gun violence), the introduction of AGLS technology does not
appear to serve as a significant concern for the results from this case study.
An increase in post-repeal gun violence also attracted the attention from the ATF resulting in
the establishment of “Operation Hustle City” (DOJ (2016)). Taking place roughly over the first
five months in 2013, this undercover storefront operation consisted of running a tattoo parlor in
the Jeff Vander Lou neighborhood in northern St. Louis where undercover ATF agents collected
information on criminal behavior and purchased illegal firearms. Although yielding no extensive
information on gun trafficking operations, this intervention led to 129 illegal firearm purchases
and 32 arrests. Reports from local law enforcement also suggests that this short-term “surge”
in ATF agents resulted in a temporary reduction in crime within the City of St. Louis. Thus, one
explanation for the decline in Missouri gun violence towards latter part of the study period involves
the spread of information concerning the increasing federal presence in places like St. Louis.
Efforts to reduce gun violence in the City of St. Louis also took place within the criminal
justice system. As a preliminary evaluation of a gun monitoring program integrating information
on gun crimes from arrest to sentencing, Rosenfeld et al. (2014) provides descriptive data on 246
gun-related arrests taking place during the first quarter of 2011 in the City of St. Louis. The
authors find that 94 percent of arrestees in their sample were Black males with a median age of
23. These individuals generally have extensive arrest records and in total account for 1,753 prior
felony arrests. The disproportionate representation of young Black men within this arrest sample
confirms the gun offending patterns presented in this study. Moreover, the significant felony arrest
records also suggests that the proliferation of illegal firearms serves a particular challenge within
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the City of St. Louis.
A variety of explanations for racial disparities in crime exists within the literature with differ-
ent policy implications emerging from each theory. The overwhelming majority of Missouri gun
violence takes place within urban disadvantaged neighborhoods in Kansas City and the Greater
St. Louis area. These areas exhibit many of the characteristics outlined in work based on social
disorganization theory and cultural norms. However, the disproportionate impact of the permit-to-
purchase law repeal on young Black Missourians suggests a greater role for behavior within sec-
ondary firearm markets and social interactions. The intense spatial concentration of gun violence
within predominately Black neighborhoods in northern St. Louis, an area historically account-
ing for greater criminal behavior, specifically alters the consequences of disputes in the presence
of expanded access to secondary firearm markets. The opening of anonymous hotlines by non-
governmental organizations to settle disputes further emphasizes how the post-repeal increase in
gun proliferation influenced social interactions–lending more credibility to a strategic complemen-
tarities argument where a reduction in gun investment costs led to an increase in equilibrium danger
(McKinstry (2017)). To the extent that the rise in Missouri gun violence remains attributable to an
increasing number of disputes being settled with firearms by youths, the implementation of inter-
ventions based on cognitive behavioral therapy have shown promise among similar demographics
in other parts of the country suffering from intense gun violence (Heller et al. (2017)).
While several aspects of Missouri gun violence exhibits similar characteristics and patterns
observed in other states, one must exhibit caution in generalizing the experiences of Missouri to
other states. The effects of deregulatory efforts within private firearm markets in other states will
depend on the extensiveness of gun culture, the nature of gun trafficking, law enforcement efforts,
and other salient determinants of gun violence.
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